The United Kingdom and U.S.-UK Relations

Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs

Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom (UK) as the United States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors, including a sense of shared history, values, and culture, as well as extensive and long-established bilateral cooperation on a wide range of foreign policy and security issues. In the minds of many Americans, the UK’s strong role in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past decade reinforced an impression of closeness and solidarity.

The 2010 UK election resulted in the country’s first coalition government since the Second World War. The Conservative Party won the most votes in the election, and Conservative leader David Cameron became the UK’s prime minister. The Conservatives partnered with the Liberal Democrats, who came in third place, with Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg named deputy prime minister. The Labour Party, now under the leadership of Ed Miliband, moved into opposition after leading the UK government since 1997.

Economic and fiscal issues have been the central domestic challenge facing the coalition thus far. Seeking to reduce the country’s budget deficit and national debt, the coalition adopted a five-year austerity program early in its tenure. With the UK entering a double-dip recession in 2012, the government has been maintaining its austerity strategy under considerable pressure and criticism. Austerity has also heightened social tensions and contributed to rising political friction between the coalition partners. Although the coalition arrangement went smoothly during its first year, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats have subsequently disagreed about a series of domestic issues, including a number of proposed changes to the country’s political system.

Europe has been another source of tension. The UK has long been one of the most skeptical and ambivalent members of the 27-country European Union (EU). While the Conservative Party remains a stronghold of “euro-skeptics,” the Liberal Democrats are the UK’s most pro-EU political party. The Eurozone crisis has deepened British antipathy toward the EU, fueling calls to reclaim national sovereignty over issues where decision-making has been pooled and integrated in Brussels. Some analysts believe that a British departure from the EU is a growing possibility; Prime Minister Cameron may seek to renegotiate some of the terms of membership and put the UK’s relationship with the EU to a national referendum in 2015. Adding another note of uncertainty to the British political landscape, Scotland plans to hold a referendum in 2014 on whether to separate from the UK and become an independent country.

In recent years, some observers have suggested that the U.S.-UK relationship is losing relevance due to changing U.S. foreign policy priorities and shifting global dynamics. An imbalance of power in favor of the United States has occasionally led some British observers to call for a reassessment of their country’s approach to the relationship. Despite such anxieties, most analysts believe that the two countries will remain close allies that choose to cooperate on many important global issues such as counterterrorism, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear activities, and global economic challenges.

Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in the UK and its relations with the United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. This report provides an overview and assessment of some of the main dimensions of these topics. For a broader analysis of transatlantic relations, see CRS Report RS22163, The United States and Europe: Current Issues, by Derek E. Mix.


Date of Report: December 20, 2012
Number of Pages: 17
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process

Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs

Since 1969, over 3,500 people have died as a result of political violence in Northern Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom. The conflict, which has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland, has reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. The Protestant majority (53%) in Northern Ireland defines itself as British and largely supports continued incorporation in the UK (unionists). The Catholic minority (44%) considers itself Irish, and many Catholics desire a united Ireland (nationalists).

For years, the British and Irish governments sought to facilitate a political settlement. After many ups and downs, the two governments and the Northern Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on April 10, 1998. The resulting Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement) called for devolved government—the transfer of power from London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive Committee in which unionist and nationalist parties would share power. The agreement also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament), policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.

Despite a much improved security situation in the years since then, full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement has been challenging. For years, instability in Northern Ireland’s devolved government was the rule rather than the exception; decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points. The devolved government was suspended for the fourth time in October 2002 amid a loss of trust and confidence on both sides of the conflict; this suspension lasted almost five years. During this time, London and Dublin led talks with Northern Ireland’s political parties to try to find a way forward.

On May 8, 2007, Northern Ireland’s devolved political institutions were restored following a power-sharing deal between the traditionally anti-agreement Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The DUP and Sinn Fein are the largest unionist and nationalist parties, respectively, in Northern Ireland and have long been viewed as the two most polarized forces in Northern Ireland politics. London and Dublin hoped that this deal would entrench the political settlement embodied in the Good Friday Agreement and produce a politically stable devolved government.

In 2008, tensions rose between the DUP and Sinn Fein over the outstanding issue of transferring authority for policing and justice affairs from London to Belfast. Given the sensitive nature of this portfolio, the parties had been unable to agree on its devolution at the time of the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. After protracted negotiations, the parties reached a deal in February 2010 paving the way for the devolution of police and justice powers in April 2010.

Successive U.S. administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, police reforms, and the status of public inquiries into several murders in Northern Ireland in which collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups is suspected. Such issues related to Northern Ireland may continue to be of interest in the 113th Congress.


Date of Report: January 10, 2013
Number of Pages: 20
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European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations

Vincent Morelli
Section Research Manager

October 2012 marked the eighth anniversary of the European Union’s decision to proceed with formal negotiations with Turkey toward full membership in the Union. During the first six months of 2012, accession negotiations with the EU had basically reached a political and technical stalemate with no additional chapters of the EU’s rules and regulations known as the acquis communautaire opened. On July 1, 2012 when the Republic of Cyprus assumed the 6- month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, over the objections of EU officials, made good on his threat to freeze relations with the EU that involved Cyprus ensuring that no formal progress on accession would be achieved for the remainder of 2012. The EU’s enlargement process is normally overseen by the member state holding the rotating EU presidency.

Sensing that the accession process would achieve little in 2012, but not wanting to place Turkey on hold until after the Cypriot EU presidency concluded, the EU Commission proposed to initiate a new relationship with Turkey outside of the formal accession negotiations. On May 17, 2012, the EU’s new “positive agenda” with Turkey was launched. The “positive agenda” was described by the Commission as intended to bring fresh dynamics into EU-Turkey relations and by others as essentially an “institutional trick” intended to circumvent the Cyprus problem. Some believe that the new initiative appeared to be an actual informal accession negotiation and seemed comprehensive enough that it could eventually replace the accession process and more fully define future relations between the EU and Turkey, for some as a “privileged partnership” and others a “virtual membership”, but for most skeptics, something short of full EU membership. It appears the “positive agenda” will continue through the Irish presidency of the EU which began on January 1, 2013.

On October 10, 2012, the European Commission issued the first of the annual EU assessments of the enlargement progress made by the candidate countries. In its report, the Commission, while offering a few positive conclusions, expressed its overall disappointment with Turkey’s progress on a number of issues leading Ankara to express its disappointment with the "biased" and "unbalanced" report. Turkey’s continued refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to EU member Cyprus, or to open Turkey’s sea and air ports to Cypriot shipping and commerce until a political settlement has been achieved on Cyprus as well as Turkey’s position on the Cyprus EU presidency were problematic. On December 11, 2012, the European Council released its conclusions on enlargement. While the Council struck a more positive note regarding Turkey’s importance and listed several issues where the Council felt Turkey had made progress, it nevertheless repeated the shortfalls outlined in the Commission’s earlier assessment. For average Turks, EU membership seems to be becoming more irrelevant as Turkey’s economy continues to thrive and as Ankara continues to reposition and strengthen itself in its own neighborhood between secular Europe and the Islamist emergence in the Middle East. Many Turks seem to feel “being European” or achieving membership in the Union may no longer be needed in order for Turkey to define itself or to have a strong partnership with Europe.

This report provides a brief overview of the EU’s accession process and Turkey’s path to EU membership. The U.S. Congress has had a long-standing interest in Turkey as a NATO ally and partner in regional foreign policy and energy security issues. Although some Members of Congress have expressed support for Turkey’s membership in the EU, congressional interest and enthusiasm seem to have diminished recently.


Date of Report: January 8, 2013
Number of Pages: 20
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Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Vincent Morelli
Section Research Manager

As 2012 drew to a close, the Republic of Cyprus concluded what many agreed was a highly successful 6-month presidency of the Council of the European Union that began on July 1, 2012. During that same 6-month period, the Republic experienced banking and fiscal crises not unlike what was taking place in Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, resulting in a request for financial assistance from the EU and the IMF and the implementation of a tough austerity program.

Lost in the preparations for and conduct of the EU presidency and the trauma of the fiscal crisis was the negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots to try to resolve the political division of Cyprus and set reunification into motion. After two years (2010-2012) of intense negotiations including regular leadership meetings, technical level discussions, and five meetings with U.N. Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon, Republic of Cyprus President Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu were unable to find common ground or make enough necessary concessions on the difficult issues of governance, security, property rights, territory, and citizenship (mostly involving mainland Turks who had “settled” in the north), all issues where both sides have longheld and very different positions, to craft a final settlement. By May 2012 the U.N.-sponsored talks having essentially reached a stalemate were suspended.

The stalemated negotiations fell victim to the convergence of several other factors. One was Christofias’s intent to make the Republic’s presidency of the EU a success by not provoking a divisive debate over what probably would have been an unpopular agreement he and Eroglu could have negotiated, to preoccupy or to ultimately overshadow the Cyprus presidency. The second was Mr. Eroglu’s decision not to meet directly with Christofias during the 6-month EU presidency despite the fact that the settlement negotiations were not part of the presidency’s mandate. A third factor was the discovery of natural gas deposits off the southern coast of Cyprus in late 2011 that led to accusations, threats, and distrust between the Republic, the Turkish Cypriots, and Ankara over how these resources would be exploited and shared between the two communities. A fourth factor was the February 2013 national election in the Republic. Without an agreement in the works and the EU presidency fast-approaching, Christofias announced he would not seek reelection in 2013, signaling that he would not try for an agreement before he left office.

The change in the status of the negotiations raised questions about how and under what conditions the talks would restart. The Turkish Cypriots saw an opportunity to hopefully start over, under different conditions, with a newly elected government in the Republic. But, Mr. Eroglu’s recent statement that, “following the elections... the negotiation table will be set up... under the roof of the state established by the TRNC people”, will likely be rejected by the incoming Greek Cypriot. These potentially new terms expressed by the Turkish Cypriots have raised the question of whether unification could be achieved at all, increasing the possibility of a permanent separation.

Legislation (H.Res. 676 and S.Con.Res. 47) had been introduced in the 112th Congress calling for support for the Republic. The Congress will likely continue to maintain its interest in a resolution of the Cyprus issue during the 113th Congress. This report provides a brief overview of the history of the negotiations, a more detailed review of the negotiations since 2008, and a description of some of the issues involved in the talks.


Date of Report: January 3, 2013
Number of Pages: 25
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