Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

Vincent Morelli
Section Research Manager

Attempts to resolve the political division of Cyprus and reunify the island have undergone various levels of negotiation for over 45 years. Between May 2010 and May 2012, Republic of Cyprus President Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu engaged in an intensified negotiation process to reach a mutually agreed settlement. Despite regular leadership meetings, continuous technical level discussions, and five meetings with U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Christofias and Eroglu were unable to find common ground or make enough necessary concessions on the difficult issues of property rights, territory, mainland Turks who had “settled” in the north, and citizenship, issues where both sides have had long-held and very different positions, to craft a final settlement.

In May 2012 the U.N.-sponsored talks, which had essentially reached a stalemate, were downgraded from leaders’ meetings to technical level discussions. With little apparent objection from either side, the talks were essentially placed on hold until at least after the 2013 national elections in the republic. This change in the status of the negotiations has raised questions about whether unification can now be achieved at all, increasing the possibility of a permanent separation.

The talks also fell victim to the convergence of several additional factors. One was that Turkey had announced on several occasions that it would not deal with any aspect of the EU that involved the Republic of Cyprus once it assumed the six-month rotating presidency of the EU on July 1, 2012. Mr. Eroglu, despite the fact that the settlement negotiations were not part of the presidency’s mandate, also declared he would not meet directly with President Christofias during the same period. A second factor was Turkey’s insistence that the U.N. convene an international conference to resolve security-related issues, which would involve Turkey. The Greek Cypriots refused to agree to such a conference until the domestic issues were resolved with the Turkish Cypriots, a condition which continued to become unlikely. A third factor contributing to the demise of the negotiations was Christofias’s intent to make the Cyprus presidency of the EU a success; Christofias clearly did not want a divisive debate over what probably would have been an unpopular agreement or a potential rejection of any agreement he and Eroglu could have negotiated to preoccupy or to ultimately overshadow the Cyprus EU presidency.

The discovery of natural gas deposits off the southern coast of Cyprus also became an issue. The ensuing accusations, threats, and distrust between the republic, the Turkish Cypriots, and Ankara over how these resources would be exploited and shared between the two communities also clouded the negotiating atmosphere. Finally, the EU Commission announced in May 2012 that it would launch a new “positive agenda” with Turkey that would seek to strengthen relations with Ankara outside of Turkey’s formal EU membership process. This may have signaled to Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots that a settlement to the Cyprus problem would no longer hold up the strengthening of EU-Turkey relations, thus lessening the urgency of a Cyprus settlement. In May, without an agreement in the works, Christofias announced he would not seek reelection in 2013, seemingly signaling that he would not try for an agreement before he left office.

The United States Congress continues to maintain its interest in a resolution of the Cyprus issue. New legislation (H.Res. 676 and S.Con.Res. 47) has been introduced in the House and Senate criticizing Turkey and calling for support for the republic. This report provides a brief overview of the early history of the negotiations, a more detailed review of the negotiations since 2008, and a description of some of the issues involved in the talks.


Date of Report: August 13, 2012
Number of Pages: 28
Order Number: R41136
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European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations

Vincent Morelli
Section Research Manager

October 2012 will mark the seventh anniversary of the European Union’s decision to proceed with formal negotiations with Turkey toward full membership in the Union. As 2012 began, Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU had basically reached a political and technical stalemate with little anticipation of being revised in the near term. During the first six months of 2012, no additional chapters of the EU’s rules and regulations known as the acquis communautaire were opened and none were likely to be opened for the remainder of 2012 as Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, over the objections of EU officials, made good on his threat to freeze certain relations with the EU when Cyprus assumed the 6-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on July 1, 2012. This was important because the accession negotiations are normally overseen by the presidency.

In their annual assessments of the progress of the accession negotiations in 2011, all three European Union institutions—the Council, Commission, and Parliament—expressed their overall disappointment with the lack of any significant progress in the talks and maintained that Turkey’s continued refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to EU member Cyprus, or to open Turkey’s sea and air ports to Cypriot shipping and commerce until a political settlement has been achieved on Cyprus, continued to be the major roadblock to progress. The current economic and financial crisis within the Eurozone and a continued healthy level of skepticism of Turkey on the part of many Europeans, fueled by cultural and religious differences, continue to dull the question of whether Turkey should be embraced as a member of the European family at all. Despite these problems, some EU member states, but particularly the EU Commission, continue to publically express a desire to see Turkey’s accession move forward.

By contrast, in Turkey, EU membership seems to be becoming more irrelevant as Turkey’s economy continues to thrive and as Ankara continues to re-position and strengthen itself in its own neighborhood between secular Europe and the Islamist emergence in the Middle East. Many Turks seem to feel Turkey’s relations with Europe are such that “being European” or achieving membership in the Union may no longer be needed in order for Turkey to define itself.

Sensing that the accession process itself would achieve little in 2012, but not wanting to place Turkey on hold until after the Cypriot EU presidency concluded, the EU Commission proposed to initiate a new relationship with Turkey outside of the accession negotiations. On May 17, 2012, the new “Positive Agenda with Turkey” was launched in Ankara by Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle and Turkish Minister for European Affairs Egemen Bağış. The “agenda”, described by the Commisison as intended to bring fresh dynamics into EU-Turkey relations and by others as essentially an institutional trick intended to circumvent the Cyprus issue, includes continued support for domestic reforms in Turkey, foreign policy cooperation, new visa policies, and migration issues, among others. Some believe that the new initiative, although not intended to replace the accession negotiations, seems comprehensive enough that it could eventually replace the accession process and more fully define future relations (a privileged partnership?) between the EU and Turkey short of EU membership.

This report provides a brief overview of the EU’s accession process and Turkey’s path to EU membership. The U.S. Congress has had a long-standing interest in Turkey as a NATO ally and partner in regional foreign policy issues. Although some Members of Congress have expressed support for Turkey’s membership in the EU, congressional enthusiasm seems to have diminished recently.


Date of Report: August 9, 2012
Number of Pages: 23
Order Number: RS22517
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The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy

Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs

The United States often looks to Europe as its partner of choice in addressing important global challenges. Given the extent of the transatlantic relationship, congressional foreign policy activities and interests frequently involve Europe. The relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) has become increasingly significant in recent years, and it is likely to grow even more important. In this context, Members of Congress often have an interest in understanding the complexities of EU policy making, assessing the compatibility and effectiveness of U.S. and EU policy approaches, or exploring the long-term implications of changing transatlantic dynamics. 

The EU As a Global Actor 

Seeking to play a more active role in global affairs, the EU has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). On many foreign policy and security issues, the 27 EU member states exert a powerful collective influence. On the other hand, some critics assert that on the whole the EU remains an economic power only, and that its foreign and security policies have little global impact. Some of the shortcomings in the EU’s external policies stem from the inherent difficulties of reaching a complete consensus among the member state governments. Moreover, past institutional arrangements have often failed to coordinate the EU’s full range of resources. 

Elements of EU External Policy 

The Common Foreign and Security Policy is based on unanimous consensus among the member states. CFSP is a mechanism for adopting common principles and guidelines on political and security issues, committing to common diplomatic approaches, and undertaking joint actions. Many analysts argue that Europe’s relevance in world affairs increasingly depends on its ability to speak and act as one.

The EU is currently conducting 12 operations under its Common Security and Defense Policy. To establish a more robust CSDP, EU member states have been exploring ways to increase their military capabilities and promote greater defense integration. These efforts have met with limited success thus far. Civilian missions and capabilities, however, are also central components of CSDP; the majority of CSDP missions have been civilian operations in areas such as police training and rule of law.

External policies in technical areas such as trade, humanitarian aid, development assistance, enlargement, and neighborhood policy are formulated and managed through a “community” process at the level of the EU institutions. (The European Neighborhood Policy seeks to deepen the EU’s relations with its southern and eastern neighbors while encouraging them to pursue governance and economic reforms.) These are the EU’s most deeply integrated external policies. Given events in North Africa, the Middle East, and some of the former Soviet states, EU policymakers have been rethinking how such external policy tools might be used to better effect. 

The United States, the EU, and NATO 

Although some observers remain concerned that a strong EU might act as a counterweight to U.S. power, others maintain that an assertive and capable EU is very much in the interest of the United States. The focus of the transatlantic relationship has changed since the end of the Cold War: it is now largely about the United States and Europe working together to manage a range of global problems. According to some experts, U.S.-EU cooperation holds the greatest potential for successfully tackling many of today’s emergent threats and concerns.

Nevertheless, NATO remains the dominant institutional foundation for transatlantic security affairs. U.S. policymakers have supported efforts to develop EU security policies on the condition that they do not weaken NATO, where the United States has a strong voice on European security issues. Despite their overlapping membership, the EU and NATO have struggled to work out an effective cooperative relationship. Analysts suggest that sorting out the dynamics of the U.S.-EUNATO relationship to allow for a comprehensive and effective use of Euro-Atlantic resources and capabilities will be a key challenge for U.S. and European policymakers in the years ahead.


Date of Report: July 11, 2012
Number of Pages: 29
Order Number: R41959
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The U.S. Congress and the European Parliament: Evolving Transatlantic Legislative Cooperation

Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs

Vincent Morelli
Section Research Manager

The United States and the European Union (EU) share an extensive, dynamic, and for many a mutually beneficial political and economic partnership. A growing element of that relationship is the role that the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament (EP)—a key EU institution—have begun to play, including in areas ranging from foreign and economic policy to regulatory reform. Proponents of establishing closer relations between the U.S. Congress and the EP point to the Parliament’s growing influence as a result of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, which took effect in December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty has increased the relative power of the EP within the EU, and in some cases, with significant implications for U.S. interests. Consequently, some officials and experts on both sides of the Atlantic have asked whether it would be beneficial for Congress and the EP to strengthen institutional ties further and to explore the possibility of coordinating efforts to develop more complementary approaches to policies in areas of mutual interest.

The Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD), the formal exchange between Congress (actually the House of Representatives) and the European Parliament, was launched in 1999, although semi-annual meetings between Congress and the EP date back to 1972. The TLD’s visibility increased somewhat following the 2007 decision to name it as an advisor to the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which seeks to “advance the work of reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers to transatlantic commerce and trade.”

In response to the TLD’s new TEC-related responsibilities, some Members of Congress suggested that there was a need for more cooperation with the EP, and raised questions with respect to how this might best be accomplished. For those Members and outside advocates of closer relations, questions have surfaced about whether the TLD itself was organized in a way that would facilitate such relations, how the standing committees in both institutions might interact, and what role, if any, for the U.S. Senate. Since 2010, regular contacts between Congress and the Parliament, including at the committee level, have fluctuated in frequency. However, many observers note that the EP has been far out in front of Congress in pursuit of a stronger relationship mostly through the many EP delegations traveling to Washington to meet their counterparts. In 2010, the Parliament opened a liaison office in Washington that was charged with keeping the EP better informed of legislative activity in Congress and vice-versa. In addition, each EP standing committee has named a “TLD Administrator” on its staff to act as a contact point between the committee and the TLD, as well as between the committee and its counterpart committee in the U.S. Congress.

While there appears to be no formal objection within Congress to increasing contacts with the European Parliament, some point out that with the exception of a few Members with previous experience in the TLD, Congress as a whole has been seen at best as ambivalent to such efforts and has not demonstrated as much enthusiasm as the EP about forging closer relations. This observation had been noted by the EP itself when at the beginning of the 112th Congress neither the new chair nor the vice chair of the USTLD were appointed until early June.

This report provides background on the Congress–EP relationship and the role of the TLD. It also explores potential future options should an effort to strengthen ties between the two bodies gain momentum. For additional information, see CRS Report RS21998, The European Parliament, by Kristin Archick.


Date of Report: July 12, 2012
Number of Pages: 32
Order Number: R41552
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The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Background and Policy Issues

Luisa Blanchfield
Specialist in International Relations

U.S. ratification of the United Nations (U.N.) Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter referred to as CRC or the Convention) may be a key area of focus during the 112th Congress, particularly if the Barack Obama Administration seeks the advice and consent of the Senate. CRC is an international treaty that aims to protect the rights of children worldwide. It defines a child as any human being under the age of 18, and calls on States Parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure that children’s rights are protected—including the right to a name and nationality; freedom of speech and thought; access to healthcare and education; and freedom from exploitation, torture, and abuse. CRC entered into force in September 1990, and has been ratified by 193 countries, making it the most widely ratified human rights treaty in the world. Two countries, the United States and Somalia, have not ratified the Convention. The President has not transmitted CRC to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Despite widespread U.S. support for the overall objectives of the Convention, policymakers have raised concerns as to whether it is an effective mechanism for protecting children’s rights. The Clinton Administration signed the Convention in February 1995, but did not submit it to the Senate primarily because of strong opposition from several Members of Congress. The George W. Bush Administration opposed CRC and expressed serious political and legal concerns with the treaty, arguing that it conflicted with U.S. laws regarding privacy and family rights. The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 focused renewed attention on the possibility of U.S. ratification. The Administration has stated that it supports the goals of the Convention and that any decision to pursue ratification of CRC will be determined through an interagency policy review. Perhaps more than other human rights treaties, CRC addresses areas that are usually considered to be primarily or exclusively under the jurisdiction of state or local governments, including education, juvenile justice, and access to healthcare. Some of these conflicting areas will likely need to be resolved by the executive branch and the Senate before the United States ratifies the Convention.

The question of U.S. ratification of CRC has generated contentious debate. Opponents argue that ratification would undermine U.S. sovereignty by giving the United Nations authority to determine the best interests of U.S. children. Some are also concerned that CRC could interfere in the private lives of families, particularly the rights of parents to educate and discipline their children. Moreover, some contend that CRC is an ineffective mechanism for protecting children’s rights. They emphasize that countries that are widely regarded as abusers of children’s rights, including China and Sudan, are party to the Convention. Supporters of U.S. ratification, on the other hand, hold that CRC’s intention is not to circumvent the role of parents but to protect children against government intrusion and abuse. Proponents emphasize what they view as CRC’s strong support for the role of parents and the family structure. Additionally, supporters hold that U.S. federal and state laws generally meet the requirements of CRC, and that U.S. ratification would strengthen the United States’ credibility when advocating children’s rights abroad.

This report provides an overview of CRC’s background and structure and examines evolving U.S. policy toward the Convention, including past and current Administration positions and congressional perspectives. It also highlights issues for the 112th Congress, including the Convention’s possible impact on federal and state laws, U.S. sovereignty, parental rights, and U.S. family planning and abortion policy. In addition, the report addresses the effectiveness of CRC in protecting the rights of children internationally and its potential use as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.


Date of Report: June 2, 2012
Number of Pages: 21
Order Number: R40484
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Rio+20: The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, June 2012

Jane A. Leggett
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy

Nicole T. Carter
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

The United Nations (U.N.) Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD or “Rio+20”) convenes June 20-22, 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This conference marks the 20th anniversary of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992. Governments participating in the 1992 meeting politically endorsed the objective of “sustainable development” as achieving economic, environmental, and social development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”

Rio+20 begins from the premise and findings that the objectives of the 1992 Rio conference have not been achieved. The U.N.’s fifth Global Environmental Outlook, published in June 2012, found significant progress toward only four of 90 internationally-agreed goals associated with sustainable development. It found back-tracking on eight goals. Stakeholders widely agree that changes in policies and institutions are desirable to improve implementation, but do not agree on means. It seems unlikely that Rio+20 will produce any agreements that would require congressional action or be legally binding. Some proceedings, however, may engender congressional interest in concepts proposed for simultaneously achieving economic, social, and environmental objectives. Rio+20 could influence views and actions internationally on development paths and practices, thereby affecting regional and global economies, demand for development aid, transnational environmental issues, and conflict incidence and resolution. Therefore, Congress may take interest in the conference. In addition, proceedings may reference the non-binding, 1992 Agenda 21, produced at UNCED in 1992; media coverage could raise questions from constituents that Members may wish to address.

The Rio+20 organizers indicate that “[g]overnments are expected to adopt clear and focused practical measures for implementing sustainable development, based on the many examples of success we have seen over the last 20 years.” However, with strongly divergent views among the expected 115 Heads of State and up to 50,000 participants, Rio+20 may be more like a trade show than political negotiations. Indeed, some observers suggest that the conference may yield many deals among private participants. It is not expected to produce a treaty or any other binding commitments of national governments. Some observers wonder whether a meaningful communique can be successfully negotiated. High-level participants will be prompted to address issues that include

• the definition of “green economy,” and whether a definition gives adequate emphasis to social aspects (e.g., “fairness”) of sustainable development; 
• whether “Sustainable Development Goals” (SDGs) should replace or supplement the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), agreed by the U.N, General Assembly in 2000 and expected to end in 2015, as well as how SDGs might be negotiated, and what priorities might be set among them; 
• how to reform international environmental institutions, particularly whether the United Nations Environmental Program should be strengthened; 
• what actions, if any, might lead to improved implementation of existing sustainable development goals, given slow progress so far; 
• whether governments may commit to greater financial and technological assistance to low-income countries to assist their sustainable development.

Date of Report: June 18, 2012
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: R42573
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Holocaust-Era Insurance Claims: Background and Proposed Legislation

Paul Belkin
Analyst in European Affairs

Kathleen Ann Ruane
Legislative Attorney

Baird Webel
Specialist in Financial Economics

In November 1998, U.S. insurance regulators, six European insurers, international Jewish organizations, and the State of Israel agreed to establish the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC). ICHEIC was tasked with identifying policyholders and administering payment of hundreds of thousands of Holocaust-era insurance policies alleged never to have been honored by European insurance companies. It ended its claims process in March 2007, having facilitated the payment of just over $300 million to 47,353 claimants. An additional $190 million was allocated to a “humanitarian fund” for Holocaust survivors and Holocaust education and remembrance.

Throughout its existence, ICHEIC was criticized, including by some Members of Congress, for delays in its claims process, for conducting its activities with a lack of transparency, and for allegedly honoring an inadequate number of claims. Although they acknowledge initial delays in the claims process, ICHEIC supporters—among them successive U.S. Administrations and European governments—argue that the process was fair and comprehensive, especially given the unprecedented legal and historical complexities of the task.

Members of Congress have shown a long-standing interest in seeking to obtain compensation for Holocaust survivors and their heirs for unpaid insurance policies. Hearings before the House Committee on Government Reform between 2001 and 2003 exposed broad criticism of ICHEIC, and legislation proposed in the 107th-111th Congresses sought to provide survivors alternative legal mechanisms to pursue claims. These proposals were never enacted and were opposed by U.S. Administrations, which considered ICHEIC the exclusive vehicle for resolving Holocaustera insurance claims.

ICHEIC’s closure, and growing concern about the well-being of aging survivors—now predominantly over 80 years old—have reignited congressional interest in Holocaust-era insurance and other compensation issues. In March 2011, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Senator Bill Nelson introduced companion legislation in the House and the Senate (H.R. 890 and S. 466) that would affirm Holocaust survivors’ and their heirs’ right to pursue claims against European insurance companies in U.S. courts and would prohibit executive agreements reached by the federal government from preempting state laws that impose disclosure requirements on European insurers. Critics of the proposed legislation argue that by effectively reversing past commitments made by the U.S. government, the bills could damage future cooperation with European governments on other Holocaust compensation and restitution issues. Furthermore, they contend that the legislation would enable costly, but likely fruitless, litigation.

This report aims to inform consideration of H.R. 890 and S. 466 and possible alternatives by providing: background on Holocaust-era compensation and restitution issues; an overview of ICHEIC, including criticism and support of its claims process and Administration policy on ICHEIC; and an overview of litigation on Holocaust-era insurance claims and the proposed legislation.


Date of Report: June 15, 2012
Number of Pages: 23
Order Number: RL34348
Price: $29.95

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Aviation and the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme

Jane A. Leggett
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy

Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Policy

Daniel T. Shedd
Legislative Attorney

Beginning January 1, 2012, most carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from commercial flights to, from, and within the European Union (EU) are covered by the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Flights are covered regardless of whether the airline or operator is based in the EU region. The EU ETS caps aviation emissions of CO2 in 2012 at 97% of the average in 2004-2006 and at 95% in each year from 2013 to 2020. Each April, beginning 2013, covered aircraft operators must turn in emission “allowances” (permits) equal to the previous year’s emissions from their flights arriving at or departing from EU airports. Airline operators will receive free allowances for 82%- 85% of their 2010 emissions. Airlines that have more allowances than they need may sell them to others or save them for future use. Airlines that need more allowances may buy them from EU auctions, other carriers, other emission sources in the EU ETS, brokers, or international emission trading mechanisms. A small reserve of free allowances will be available for new or rapidly expanding airlines.

The entry into force of an EU law covering international aviation emissions is a significant move in a two-decade process concerning whether and how aviation emissions of CO2 may be abated. Even among those who agree on the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, how to share reductions across nations and sectors remains a continuing, major controversy internationally and within countries. Emissions from international air transport have, since early negotiations, posed a particular challenge.

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol (to which the United States is not a Party) specified that Parties should pursue limitation or reduction of GHG emissions from aviation fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an agency of the United Nations. In 2008, the EU cited a lack of “substantive progress” in ICAO and legislated to include aviation in its existing EU ETS by 2012. ICAO members have agreed to a variety of voluntary actions and goals. In October 2011, faced with impending inclusion of aviation emissions in the EU ETS, the ICAO Council agreed to accelerate its work, including continuing to explore market-based measures, CO2 standards for new aircraft, and other options.

EU officials have stated their preference for agreeing on global, binding measures in ICAO. One official stated that the EU would agree to suspend inclusion of aviation in the ETS only if a new global ICAO scheme met three conditions: it must deliver more emissions reductions than the EU ETS on its own; it must have targets and measures; and any action must be non-discriminatory and apply to all airlines. Alternatively, EU law allows exemptions for incoming flights from countries that have adopted “equivalent measures” to reduce emissions. Some countries are likely negotiating with the EU for an equivalent measures exemption for their airlines.

Air carriers from the United States and other countries have vociferously objected to inclusion of international aviation in the EU ETS. The U.S. government and other nations have pressed the EU to exclude foreign carriers. Two bills in Congress address the controversy. The U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 2594, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011. It would prohibit U.S. aircraft operators from participating in the EU ETS. It also would direct the Administration to negotiate and take other actions to ensure that U.S. civil aircraft operators are not penalized by any unilateral EU regulation of GHG emissions. A similar bill with more flexibility, S. 1956, was introduced in the Senate. In January 2012, House and Senate conferees on reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) agreed to a sense of the Congress resolution opposing the EU action.


Date of Report: June 11, 2012
Number of Pages: 44
Order Number: R42392
Price: $29.95

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